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  1 Introduction
Many social, economic, and political interactions take the form of a network of bilateral
relationships. This ranges from friendships to trading relationships and political alliances.
As the structure of the network of relationships can have a profound impact on the welfare
of all the involved parties, it is essential to develop a good understanding of which networks
are likely to form and how this depends on the speci¯cs of the circumstances. This paper
contributes to a growing literature that models network formation.1
Here, our focus is on the role played by transfers payments in the formation of social and
economic networks. In many applications, agents bargain on possible transfers at the time
of forming relationships. For example, when two airlines form a code-sharing agreement,
included in that agreement are the details of how the costs and revenues on cross-booked
passengers are to be split. Similarly, when two political parties form an electoral pact, they
explicitly or implicitly agree on the division of seats, committee positions, cabinet posts, and
government bene¯ts. Without transfer payments (in currency or in kind), many agreements
would simply never exist.
Our ¯rst objective in this paper is to construct a simple model where the agreement on
transfers is part of the process of the formation of links. Our second objective is to study
how the formation of networks depends on the types of transfers that agents can make. How
important is it that agents can subsidize the formation of links that they are not directly
involved in? How important is it that agents be able to make payments contingent on the
full network that emerges? What is the role of making payments to other players if they
refrain from forming links? Since the types of payments that agents will have at their dis-
cretion depends on the application, the answers to these questions help us to understand the
relationship between the networks that emerge, and for instance whether e±cient networks
form, and the speci¯cs of the social or economic interaction.
Our results outline some simple and intuitive relationships between the types of transfers
available and the networks that emerge. The main results can be summarized as follows.
If transfers can only be made between the players directly involved in a link, then the set
of networks that emerge as equilibria are characterized by a balance condition. While there
are some settings where e±cient networks are supported with only direct transfers, there are
many settings where the networks that form will be ine±cient. If players can make indirect
transfers, so that they can subsidize the formation of links between other players, then they
can properly account for some forms of positive externalities. However, even with indirect
transfers, we still need to worry about the fact that there are many di®erent combinations
of links that players might consider forming or not forming. Thus, even though links are
bilateral, the multitude of such relationships results in some multilateral decision problems.
This means that in order to guarantee that e±cient networks form, players need not only
to be able to make indirect transfers in order to deal with (positive) externalities, but also
to make those transfers contingent on the network that emerges in order to take care of the
multitude of interrelated bilateral problems. Thus, there is a basic sense in which one can
1See Jackson (2003b) for a survey of the literature that is most closely related to our work here.
2view the role of indirect payments as taking care of externalities, and contingencies as taking
care of the combinatorial nature of network formation. Finally, in order to handle negative
externalities, players need to be able to pay other players not to form links. Our analysis
also includes some discussion of how to model equilibrium, and we defer all discussion of that
analysis until we have laid out the details of the network formation games. This outlining
of the relationship between the types of transfers admitted and the types of externalities
and the multilateral decision problem that are overcome is the ¯rst that we know of in the
networks literature, or even the contracting literature for that matter.
Before presenting the model, let us brie°y discuss its relationship to the most closely
related literature. This paper ¯ts into a recent literature that examines network formation
when players act in their own interest and their payo®s may depend on the whole structure
of the network.2 In such network games, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) showed that the
networks that maximize society's overall payo® will often not be stable in an equilibrium
sense, regardless of how players' payo®s are allocated or re-allocated (subject to two basic
conditions of anonymity and component balancedness).3 Moreover, simple examples showed
that even when players have the ability to make side-payments, e±cient networks may fail
to form because side-payments do not enable players to overcome the di±culties linked with
network externalities.
This tension between e±ciency and stability underlies our analysis of link formation with
transfers, and we develop a deeper understanding of the source of such ine±ciencies. We
identify two reasons why side-payments may be ine®ective in resolving the con°ict between
e±ciency and stability. First, there is the fairly obvious point that widespread externalities
in the network may imply that agents have to have input into the formation of links by
other players for the e±cient network to form. For example, if the e±cient network involves
the formation of a link between two players who get a negative utility from that link, side-
payments will be ine®ective in reaching the e±cient outcome. Second, is the less obvious
point that since players are involved in multiple bilateral relationships at the same time, side-
payments negotiated bilaterally may not be su±cient to sustain the formation of e±cient
networks. In some situations, players may have an incentive to renege on di®erent relation-
ships at once, even though each bilateral relationship can be sustained by side-payments.
The main message of this paper is that the two di±culties identi¯ed above can be overcome
by enlarging the range of possible transfers, and can be traced to speci¯c features of the
transfers. Network externalities can be dealt with if players have the ability to make indirect
transfers, subsidizing the formation of links by other players or paying players not to form
links. The combinatorial di±culties linked to the multitude of bilateral relationships can be
solved if players have the ability to make contingent transfers depending on the network be-
ing formed. In particular, if players can make indirect contingent transfers, e±cient networks
2See Jackson (2003a) for a survey of this literature; as well as Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a)
for a look at the literature that deals with communication structures in cooperative game theory, where a
graph structure determines which coalitions can generate value.
3See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) for detailed discussion of the role
of the conditions.
3can be sustained by individual incentives under very mild regularity conditions.
Ours is not the ¯rst paper to look at the endogenous determination of payo®s together
with network formation. Recent models of network formation by Currarini and Morelli
(2000) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002)4 allow players to simultaneously bargain over the
formation of links and the allocation of value. In particular, Currarini and Morelli (2000),
and Mutuswami and Winter (2002), model network formation as a sequential process where
players move in turn and announce the total payo® that they demand from the eventual
network that will emerge, as well as the speci¯c links that they are willing form. The
network that forms as a function of the announcements is the largest one such that the total
demands are compatible with the total value that is generated. They show that the equilibria
of such games are e±cient networks, assuming that there are no externalities across network
components and that some other payo® monotonicity conditions are satis¯ed. Part of the
intuition is that by moving in sequence and making such take it or leave it demands, players
can extract their marginal contribution to an e±cient network, and this provides correct
incentives in some situations.
Currarini and Morelli (2000) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) make the important
point that the ability to determine payo®s in conjunction with link formation may aid in
the emergence of e±cient networks. However, these sequential games have special features
and are better for illustrating the importance of taking such bargaining seriously (or for
implementing variations on the Shapley value), than for providing reasonable models of
network formation. In particular, the end-gaming and ¯nite extensive forms drive the results.
Moreover, while they provide some su±cient conditions for the support of e±cient networks,
they do not give us much of a feel for how generally this might hold, or how this depends on
the structure of the process. In particular, the nature of the game does not even allow an
analysis of which players pay which others - essentially everything is implicitly centralized.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our notations for
players and networks. We describe the di®erent models of network formation in Section
3. We then study the di®erent models in turn. Section 4 is devoted to the direct transfer
game, Section 5 to the indirect transfer game, Section 6 to contingent transfers and Section
7 to a game where players may pay to prevent the formation of links by other players. We
conclude in Section 8. The paper ends with two Appendices. Appendix A discusses the
relation between pairwise stability, as de¯ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and the
networks supported by the direct transfer game. Appendix B contains the proofs of our
results.
4See also Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b) in the context of communication games.
5We have become aware of independent work by Matsubayashi and Yamakawa (2004) who analyze a
game which operates on a link by link basis, as do some of the games we study here. Their work focuses
on Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) connections model, and a game where players negotiate over how much
of the cost of a link each player will bear. Thus, there is almost no overlap with our results.
42 Modeling Networks
Players and Networks
N = f1;:::;ng is the set of players who may be involved in a network relationship.6
A network g is a list of pairs of players who are linked to each other. For simplicity, we
denote the link between i and j by ij,s oij 2 g indicates that i and j are linked in the
network g. Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The network gN is referred to as
the complete network. The set G = fg ½ gNg denotes the set of all possible networks on N:
For any network g 2 G, let N(g) be the set of players who have at least one link in the
network g. That is, N(g)=fi j9 j s:t:i j2 gg. Given a player i 2 N and a network g 2 G,
let Li(g) denote the set of links in g involving player i, Li(g)=fjk 2 gjj = io rk= ig:
Paths and Components
A path in a network g 2 G between players i and j is a sequence of players i1;:::;i K
such that ikik+1 2 g for each k 2f 1;:::;K¡ 1g, with i1 = i and iK = j.
A component of a network g, is a nonempty subnetwork g0 ½ g, such that
² if i 2 N(g0) and j 2 N(g0) where j 6= i, then there exists a path in g0 between i and j,
and
² if i 2 N(g0) and ij 2 g, then ij 2 g0.
Utility Functions
The utility of a network to player i is given by a function ui : G ! I R+.7 Let u denote
the vector of functions u =( u1;:::;u n). We normalize payo®s so that ui(;)=0 .
A utility function tells us what value accrues to any given player as a function of the
network. This might include all sorts of costs, bene¯ts, and externalities.
For any network g 2 G and subset of links ` ½ g, we de¯ne the marginal utility of the
links ` in g to player i by mui(g;`)=ui(g) ¡ ui(g n `):
Externalities
While the class of utility functions we consider is completely general, the following de¯-
nitions of externalities will prove useful.
A pro¯le of utility functions u satis¯es no externalities if ui(g)=ui(g + jk) for all g,
jk = 2 g, and i= 2 jk.
A pro¯le of utility functions u satis¯es nonpositive externalities if ui(g) ¸ ui(g + jk) for
all g, jk = 2 g, and i= 2 jk.
6For background and discussion of the model of networks discussed here, see Jackson (2003b).
7As opposed to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we do not distinguish between a value function and an
allocation rule. Instead, our primitive is the set of individual values for every network.
5A pro¯le of utility functions u satis¯es nonnegative externalities if ui(g) · ui(g +jk) for
all g, jk = 2 g, and i= 2 jk:
These de¯nitions of externalities are not exhaustive since there are settings where some
links may result in positive externalities and others in negative externalities, or the nature of
the externality may di®er across players. Nevertheless, these de¯nitions provide a useful or-
ganizing device, and can easily be interpreted. Situations with no externalities correspond to
cases where players only care about who they are connected to, but no further information.
Nonpositive (negative) externalities arise when players are hurt by the formation of links by
other players. An example of this is the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996),
where a player is hurt if their co-authors take on other co-authors. Other examples of these
are seen in Goyal and Joshi (2003), where two ¯rms form strategic alliances and other ¯rms
are harmed by the resulting reduction in marginal cost; or in Goyal and Joshi (2000) and
Furusawa and Konishi (2002), where two countries enter into a free-trade agreement and
other countries su®er. Nonnegative (positive) externalities arise when players bene¯t from
the formation of new links. In Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) and connections model, exter-
nalities are positive as all players bene¯t from an increase in the friendship/communication
network. Positive externalities also emerge in Belle°amme and Bloch (2001)'s collusive net-
works, where market sharing agreements reduce the number of competitors on the market
to the bene¯t of other ¯rms.
Values and E±ciency
A network g 2 G Pareto dominates a network g0 2 G relative to u if ui(g) ¸ ui(g0) for
all i 2 N, with strict inequality for at least one i 2 N. A network g 2 G is Pareto e±cient
relative to u if it is not Pareto dominated.
A network g 2 G is e±cient relative to u if it maximizes
P
i ui(g).
When transfers are possible, Pareto e±ciency and e±ciency are equivalent, so we focus
here on e±cient networks.8
3 Network Formation Games
We consider several models of network formation where various types of transfers are avail-
able, and examine which networks emerge as equilibria of these games. There are two basic
versions of the game, allowing for direct or indirect transfers. In the direct transfer game,
players can only bargain over the distribution of payo®s of the links they are involved with.
In the indirect transfer game, players can subsidize the formation of links by other players.
We later extend both games to allow for contingent transfers.
The Direct Transfer Network Formation Game
8For a detailed discussion of various notions of e±cient networks in the presence of transfers, see Jackson
(2003a).
6In the direct transfer game, every player i 2 N announces a vector of transfers ti 2 I Rn¡1.
We denote the entries in this vector by ti
ij, representing the transfer that player i proposes
on link ij: Announcements are simultaneous.
Link ij is formed if and only if ti
ij+t
j
ij ¸ 0: Formally, the network that forms as a function













This game is easily interpreted. Players simultaneously announce a transfer for each
possible link that they might form. If the transfer is positive, it represents the o®er that the
player makes to form the link. If the transfer is negative, it represents the demand that a




In that case, we hold both players to their promises. If for instance ti
ij > ¡t
j
ij > 0, player i
ends up making a bigger payment than player j demanded. Player j only gets his demand,
and the excess payment is wasted.
It is important to note that wasted transfers will never occur in equilibrium, and alter-
native speci¯cations of the game (for instance, letting player i only pay player j's demand or
player j receive the total o®er of player i) would not change the structure of the equilibria.
The Indirect Transfer Network Formation Game
In the indirect transfer game, every player i announces a vector of transfers ti 2 I Rn(n¡1)=2.
The entries in the vector ti are given by ti
jk, denoting the transfer that player i puts on the
link jk.I fi= 2 jk, ti
jk ¸ 0. Player i can make demands on the links that he or she involved
with (it is permissible to have ti
ij < 0), but can only make o®ers on the other links. The
reasoning here is that a player cannot prevent the formation of a link between two other
players (except possibly by paying them not to form the link, as we consider later).
Link jk is formed if and only if
P
i2N ti
jk ¸ 0: Formally, the network that forms as a














Network Formation Games with Contingent Transfers
7In the games we have de¯ned above, players only have a limited ability to condition their
actions on the actions of other players. Those games do not allow for contingent contracts
of the form \I will pay you to form link ij only if link jk is also formed." It turns out that
being able to make this kind of contingent contract can be very important, and so we now
de¯ne such games.
Every player announces a vector of contingent transfers ti(g) contingent on g forming,
for each conceivable nonempty g 2 G. In the direct transfer game, ti(g) 2 I Rn¡1 for each i,
while in the indirect transfer game, ti(g) 2 I Rn¡1!
There are many possible ways to determine which network forms given a set of contingent
announcements. We consider the following one, but it will become clear that the results are
robust to changes in the way the network is determined. Let there be an ordering over
G, captured by a function ¾ which maps G onto f1;:::;#Gg. The network that forms
is determined as follows. Start with the ¯rst network, g1 such that ¾(g1) = 1, and check
whether g(t(g1)) = g1: If the answer is yes, then this is the network that forms. Otherwise,
move on to the second network, g2, and continue the process until we ¯nd such a network.
The network formed is thus the ¯rst network gk in the ordering for which g(t(gk)) = gk.I f
there is no such k, then the empty network forms.
Equilibrium and Supporting a Network















in the contingent game.
A vector t forms an equilibrium of one of the above games if it is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the game. That is, t is an equilibrium if
¼(t) ¸ ¼(t¡i;b t
i);
for all i and b ti.
We say that a network g is supported via a given game relative to a pro¯le of utility
functions u =( u1;:::;u n) if there exists an equilibrium t of the game such that g(t)=g.
A Comment on Simultaneous Move Games
9This equation includes ti
jk, even when i= 2 jk, and such transfers are not included in the direct transfer
game. Simply set ti
jk = 0 when i= 2 jk for the direct transfer game.
8A critical advantage of considering a simultaneous version of network formation is that
after seeing the resulting network and transfers, players will not wish to make further changes
to their transfers and links. This is not true if one instead models network formation sequen-
tially, by having the players move in some order. It could be that the resulting network and
transfers would not be stable if players could then come back and make further changes.
Regardless of whether one thinks that network formation is simultaneous, the conditions
imposed by equilibrium are necessary conditions for any process to come to a stable position.
That is, the equilibrium conditions that are derived here are conditions that capture the idea
that we have arrived at a network such that no players would gain from further changes.
A Re¯nement: Pairwise Equilibrium
The simultaneity of announcements has a drawback; but one that we can easily deal
with. It allows for a multiplicity of equilibrium networks as a result of coordination failures.
Consider for example the following example where all the transfer games are equivalent.





There are two supported networks. One is the empty network and the other is complete
network (one link). The complete network is supported by transfers t1
12 = t2
12 =0 . T o
support the empty network, set t1
12 = t2
12 = ¡t, where t ¸ 1. In the second equilibrium, the
link is not formed because both players expect the other to make an unreasonable demand.
Note that the equilibrium supporting the empty network survives an elimination of weakly
dominated strategies and is also a trembling hand perfect equilibrium.10 To eliminate this
equilibrium using standard re¯nements would require the machinery of iterative elimination
of strategies, which is cumbersome in games with a continuum of actions.
Alternatively, we should expect players forming a link to be able to coordinate their
actions on that formation, as the real-life process that we are modeling would generally
already involve some form of direct communication. This suggests a very simple re¯nement.




A vector t is a pairwise equilibrium of one of the above games if it is an equilibrium of









ij) ¸ ¼j(t), and
(3) at least one of (1) or (2) holds strictly.11
This re¯nement allows any two agents who have not yet formed a link to change their
demands and o®ers in order to add a link. We focus attention on the addition of links, as
players can already unilaterally choose to sever links by increasing their demands. Hence,
the proper incentives to sever links are already captured by Nash equilibrium.12
While it is clear that Nash equilibria always exist in all the games we consider (the
empty network is always supported in equilibrium), the existence of pairwise equilibria is
not guaranteed. The following example shows that there exist environments for which no
pairwise equilibrium exists.





























































11Given the continuity of transfers, this is easily seen to be equivalent to requiring that both (1) and (2)
hold strictly.
12There are many other re¯nements we could also consider. In the indirect transfer game, it seems natural
to allow all agents to change their transfers on a given link, and we do introduce this more stringent re¯nement
later. However, we believe that these more stringent re¯nements are harder to justify. Once one allows for
such group deviations, it makes sense to go all the way to allowing general group deviations. At that point
one is led to something that is equivalent to the concept of strong stability with side payments of Jackson and
van den Nouweland (2000). Such a re¯nement is quite stringent, and while it has the nice property of only



























The empty network is a (pure strategy Nash) equilibrium, but not a pairwise equilibrium:
two players can set zero demands to form a link and get 1 > 0. No network that has at least
two links can be supported as an equilibrium. Any such network must involve a player who
gets a negative payo®, and who could pro¯tably deviate by setting high demands on all his
links which results in a payo® of 0. Finally, a network with one link cannot be a pairwise
equilibrium. The unlinked player and either of the linked players would bene¯t from setting
transfers ¡3:5 and 3:5, respectively.
4 The Direct Transfer Game
We now provide an analysis of the direct transfer network formation game. This is a natural,
and the simplest, game to capture direct bargaining in the formation of links. We start with a
simple example to show that externalities may prevent the emergence of an e±cient network
in equilibrium.





All other networks result in a utilities of 0 for all players.
The e±cient network is the line f12;23g. For this network to be supported, we must
have t3
23 ·¡ 1, as otherwise 3 would bene¯t by lowering t3.I ft2
23 ¸ 1 ¸¡ t3
23, player 2 will
bene¯t by lowering t2
23, regardless of what other links have formed as u2 is 0 for all other
networks. Thus, the network f12;23g cannot be supported in equilibrium.
This example shows that, in the presence of positive externalities, direct transfers may
be insu±cient to guarantee that e±cient networks are supported in equilibrium. In fact,
this example clearly suggests that indirect transfers (in the form of link subsidization) are
needed to support e±cient networks in equilibrium.
11The next example shows that, even in the absence of any externalities, the e±cient
network may fail to form in equilibrium.
Example 4 The E±cient Network is Not Supportable in the Complete Absence of Exter-
nalities.
Consider a three-player society and a pro¯le of utility functions described as follows. Any
player gets a payo® of 0 if he or she does not have any links. Player 1 gets a payo® of 2 if
she has exactly one link, and a payo® of 1 if she has two links. Player 2 gets a payo® of -2
if he has exactly one link, and a payo® of 0 if he has two links. Player 3's payo® function is
similar to that of player 2: he gets a payo® of -2 if he has exactly one link, and a payo® of
0 if he has two links.
It is clear from this speci¯cation that all players' payo®s depend only on the con¯guration
of their own links and so there are no externalities in payo®s. This payo® structure is pictured



























































































Let us argue that there is no equilibrium of the direct transfer game that supports the
complete network, which is the unique e±cient network . By setting t2
2i · 0 for each i, player
2 gets a payo® of at least 0. The same is true for player 3. Thus, players 2 and 3 must have
a payo® of at least 0 in any equilibrium. Now, suppose by contradiction that the complete
network were supported in an equilibrium. It would follow that t1
1i ¸ 0 for at least one i,o r
13otherwise one of players 2 and 3 would have a negative payo®. Without loss of generality,
suppose that t1
12 ¸ 0. Player 1's payo® would then be 1 ¡ t1
12 ¡ t1
13. Suppose that player 1
deviated and changed t1
12 so that t1
12 +t2
12 < 0. Then the network that would form would be
13;23 and player 1's payo® would become 2 ¡ t1




12 ¸ 0). Hence player 1 would have a pro¯table deviation, and the complete network cannot
be supported in equilibrium.
This example points to another di±culty in sustaining e±cient networks. Players can
choose to delete any combination of links. In order to sustain a given network as an equi-
librium, it must be that each possible deviation is unpro¯table, and each combination of
links that could be deleted might require di®erent transfers in order to be avoided. Some
of these combinations might be in con°ict with each other. In the above example, it is the
possibilities that either player 2 or 3 might sever both of his links that lies in con°ict with
what player 1 can get by severing a single link at a time.
The preceding examples suggest two features that the link formation game must have
in order to always result in e±cient networks in equilibrium. First, indirect transfers are
needed in order to take care of externalities, as suggested by Example 3. Second, as Example
4 suggests, transfers need to be contingent on the network in order to adjust to the particular
combination of links that are formed.
Before turning to a full analysis of the games with indirect transfers and/or contingent
transfers, we analyze the game with only direct transfers. We do this for several reasons.
First, there may be applications where this is the most appropriate game; second, this serves
as a useful benchmark; and third, if an e±cient network can be supported via just direct
transfers, then it is in a sense more plausible that it will emerge than one that requires a
more involved transfer scheme to sustain it.
We ¯rst o®er a complete characterization of the networks that can be supported in
equilibrium of the direct transfer game, and then we identify some settings where direct
transfers su±ce to support e±cient networks.
A Complete Characterization of Networks Supported by Direct Transfers: The
Network Balance Condition
A set of nonnegative weights f¹i











for each ij 2 g.








for every balanced vectors of weights.
14We should emphasize that the balance conditions identi¯ed here are di®erent both in
structure and implications from the balance conditions used in cooperative game theory. Our
balance condition assigns weights to each player and combination of bilateral links involving
that player. This contrasts with weights assigned to coalitions in cooperative games, and
re°ects the bilateral structure of networks. This also re°ects the fact that these balance
conditions are set to address an equilibrium notion that deals with deviations by at most
two individuals at a time.
Proposition 1 A network g is supportable as an equilibrium of the direct transfer network
formation game relative to the pro¯le of utility functions u if and only if it is balanced relative
to the pro¯le of utility functions u.
The proof of Proposition 1, together with all of our other proofs, appears in the appendix.
It follows a logic similar to that of the proof of the existence of the core for balanced games,
exploiting duality to convert the problem of existence of transfers into a set of balance
conditions. There are a couple of twists due to the bilateral nature of the problem, but the
proof is fairly short. While balance conditions are not transparent to interpret, they still have
a simple intuition. They examine whether or not all of the possible marginal utilities from
potential deviations can be overcome via some set of transfers. Our balance conditions prove
useful in exploring su±cient conditions for e±cient networks to be supported in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 only characterizes supportability, and not supportability via pairwise equi-
librium. Clearly this provides necessary, but not su±cient conditions for supportability via
pairwise equilibrium. The additional constraints imposed by pairwise equilibrium are di±-
cult to capture through balancedness conditions. Nevertheless, we can identify a su±cient
condition, as follows.
Proposition 2 If a network g is supportable via pairwise equilibrium by the direct transfer
network formation, then it is balanced relative to the pro¯le of utility functions u. Conversely,
if u satis¯es nonnegative externalities, and g is e±cient and balanced relative to u, then g is
supportable via pairwise equilibrium by the direct transfer network formation game.
More generally, we show the following lemma, which also applies to the indirect transfer
game.
Lemma 1 If g is e±cient and supportable via the direct or indirect transfer game, and u
satis¯es nonnegative externalities, then g is supportable in pairwise equilibrium.
Supportability with Nonpositive Externalities and Convexity in Own-Links
We now identify su±cient conditions for the e±cient network to be supported in equilib-
rium, using the intuition of Examples 3 and 4. Example 3 suggests that we should look at
15situations where externalities are nonpositive. Example 4 suggests a restriction that marginal
payo®s from a given set of links be at least as high as the sum of the marginal payo®s from
separate links. This condition is formalized as follows.





for all i, g, and ` ½ Li(g).
Under these two conditions e±cient networks are supportable, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 If utility functions are convex in own-links and satisfy nonpositive exter-
nalities, then any e±cient network g is supportable via the direct transfer game. If utility
functions are convex in own links and satisfy no externalities, then g is supportable via a
pairwise equilibrium.13
Goyal and Joshi (2003)'s model of networks of collaboration in oligopoly provides an
example of a setting where convexity in own links and nonpositive externalities hold. Suppose
that n ¯rms are engaged in quantity competition in a market for a homogeneous good. By
forming a link, ¯rms can decrease their constant marginal cost of production. Suppose
that cost reductions are an increasing but concave function of the number of links, c(´i(g))
where ´i(g) denotes the number of edges of ¯rm i in the graph g: It is easy to check that the
formation of links by players j and k reduces the production costs of those two ¯rms, resulting
in a decrease in the pro¯t of ¯rm i and so there are nonpositive (negative) externalities.
Furthermore, when the additional bene¯t of a new link is decreasing with the number of
links the ¯rm has already formed, convexity in own links holds. Thus, Proposition 3 applies
and the e±cient network is supportable via the direct transfer game.
Link-Separable Payo®s
While Proposition 3 shows that the e±cient network is supported as one equilibrium
of the game, it does not guarantee that no other networks will be supported as equilibria
as well. In order to check when e±cient networks may be supported as the only pairwise
13Toni Calvo-Armengol has pointed out to us that this proposition holds if we weaken convexity in own-
links to only require that there exist some ®>0 such that mui(g;`) ¸ ®
P
ij2` mui(g;ij) for all i, g, and
` ½ Li(g). [The proof in the appendix is easily modi¯ed, by simply placing an ® on the right hand side of
the inequalities.] This captures some applications, such as the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), which satis¯es nonpositive externalities and the ® version of convexity in own links, but does not
satisfy convexity in own links. We have not stated the proposition using this weaker convexity condition, as
Proposition 5, which uses a parallel convexity condition cannot be stated in the weaker form.
16equilibria of the direct transfer game, we turn to a special case of convexity in own links,
where payo®s are separable across links.
Payo®s are link-separable, if for each player i there exists a vector wi 2 I Rn¡1, where wi
jk







This very strong condition states that players view relationships completely separately. A
special case of link separable payo®s is one where agents only care about their direct links.
Corollary 1 If payo®s are link-separable and have nonpositive externalities, then any ef-
¯cient network g is supportable via the direct transfer game. Furthermore, if payo®s are
link-separable and have no externalities, then g is supportable via a pairwise equilibrium if
and only if g is e±cient.
The ¯rst statement and ¯rst part of the second statement follow from Proposition 3. To
see the only if claim, suppose to the contrary that g is supportable via a pairwise equilibrium




i ui(g). As payo®s are link
separable and have no externalities, either there exists ij 2 gng0 such that wiij + wjij < 0
or there exists ij 2 g0ng and wiij + wjij > 0. In the ¯rst case, g cannot be supported as
an equilibrium, because one of the two players has an incentive to increase her demanded
transfer thereby severing the link; in the second case, g cannot be supported as a pairwise
equilibrium, since will exist a pair of compatible transfer such that the players have an
incentive form the link.
Distance-Based Payo®s and Stars
Convexity in own links and nonpositive externalities are su±cient conditions for the
e±cient network to be supported as an equilibrium of the direct transfer game, but are by no
means necessary, as there are other conditions that ensure that network balance is satis¯ed.
We now exhibit another class of utility functions, which violate both these conditions, but
for which the e±cient network can be sustained in equilibrium. This is the class of distance
based utilities, where players get value from the number of players they are linked to, and
this value is decreasing with the distance of the connection.
Let d(i;j) denote the distance between i and j in terms of the number of links in the
shortest path between them (setting d(i;j)=1 if there is no path).





for all i, where c ¸ 0 is a cost per link, and f is a nonincreasing function.
17A distance-based payo® structure is one where players may get bene¯ts from indirect
connections, but where those bene¯ts are determined by the shortest paths. Special cases
of distance-based payo®s are the connections model and truncated connections models of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In such settings, \star" networks play a very central role, as
captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If u is distance-based, then the unique e±cient network structure is
(i) the complete network gN if c<f(1) ¡ f(2),
(ii) a star encompassing all players if f(1) ¡ f(2) <c<f(1) +
(n¡2)f(2)
2 , and
(iii) the empty network if f(1) +
(n¡2)f(2)
2 .
In the case where c is equal to f(1) ¡ f(2) or f(1) +
(n¡2)f(2)
2 , there are can be a variety
of network structures that are e±cient. Nevertheless, the star is still e±cient in those cases.
The proof of Proposition 4 is an easy extension of the proof of a Proposition in Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996), but we include it in the appendix for completeness.
It turns out that e±cient networks can be supported (even by pairwise equilibrium) in
the direct transfer game for distance-based payo® structures. This result is related to the
special nature of the e±cient network. In a star, every player is related to the center and
positive externalities pass through the center. Peripheral players can subsidize the center
of the star to keep their links formed, and this properly accounts for externalities. This is
captured in the following corollary to Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 2 If u is distance-based, then some e±cient network is supportable as an equi-
librium the direct transfer game, and is also supportable in pairwise equilibrium.
The claim is easy to see directly in cases where either the empty or complete networks
are e±cient. Consider the remaining case where f(1) ¡ f(2) · c · f(1) +
(n¡2)f(2)
2 , and
thus a star involving all players is e±cient. Here, we let us discuss how one can verify the
balance conditions. An agent i connected to the center j in a star has only one link, we can
simply set ¹i





The fact that a star is balanced then follows from noting that cmui(g;ij)+c¹j(g;ij)=
2f(1)+(n¡2)f(2)¡2c ¸ 0 in situations where the star is e±cient, and noting that the center's
payo® is additively separable across links.14 Proposition 2 implies that we can support an
e±cient g as a pairwise equilibrium, noting that there are nonnegative externalities in a
distance-based u (as adding a link that does not involve i can only increase i's payo® as it
may decrease the distance between i and some other agent, but does not impose a cost on i)
14This also gives us an idea of which transfers support a star as an equilibrium with agent 1 as the center.
Setting ti
1i = f(1) + (n ¡ 2)f(2) ¡ c, ti
ji = ¡(n ¡ 1)f(1) for j>1, and t1
1i = ¡[f(1) + (n ¡ 2)f(2) ¡ c] for
each i. It is easily seen that these form an equilibrium that supports the star.
185 Indirect Transfers
As discussed above, indirect transfers are needed to overcome some of the di±culties linked
to positive externalities in the network. However, in the indirect transfer game, convexity in
own-links is no longer su±cient to overcome the di±culty due to the deletion of combinations
of links, as a player's deviation can result in the severance of links in which he is not involved.
Thus the problem associated with the interaction of the multitude of bilateral relationships
is more complex when indirect transfers are present. This is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 5 E±cient Network are not Supportable with Indirect Transfers and Convexity in
Own-Links






















































































19The complete network is e±cient but is not the outcome of any equilibrium of the indirect
transfer network formation game. Consider any player i. Player i must o®er to subsidize
the link jk by an amount of at least .4, as otherwise at least one of j and k will have an
incentive to \sever" the link (set their demand to be less than ¡:2).
Consider some player i and link ij such that ti
ij ¸ 0. Such a link must exist if the complete
network is supported. Consider the following deviation: player i reduces the payment on the
link jk and \severs" link ij (setting ti
ij to be low enough so that ij does not form). In that
case, the only link formed is link ik, and player i's base payo® is the increased, and transfers
have decreased which is strict improvement for player i.
The above network is convex in own-links, as the marginal utility of any second own-
link is negative while the marginal utility of any set of two own-links is always positive.
However, note that the convexity in links fails more generally. The marginal utility to player
1 at the complete network of the links 12,23 is negative, while the marginal utility of 23 at
the complete network is 1.1, and the marginal utility of 12 is -.2, so the sum of the marginal
utilities is positive. Indeed, this is the source of the problem in the example.
Convexity in All Links





for all i, g, and any ` ½ g.
We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If payo®s are convex in all links, then any e±cient network g is support-
able via the indirect transfer game. If payo®s also have nonnegative externalities, then g is
supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
With indirect transfers, e±cient networks can thus be supported irrespective of the na-
ture of externalities in payo®s if one simply requires equilibrium, and can be supported
under nonnegative externalities if we require pairwise equilibrium. However, the convexity
assumption property needed to support e±cient networks is stronger than "convexity in own
links" which was required to support e±cient networks in the direct transfer game. In words,
we require that the marginal bene¯t of any subset of links (and not only the links involving
the player) be greater than the sum of the additional bene¯ts link per link. This convexity
assumption is likely to be satis¯ed when the marginal bene¯t of a new link is decreasing
with the number of links already formed. Examples of such situations are trading and infor-
mation sharing networks. In these networks, the addition of new connections typically has
positive externalities on all the players. All players bene¯t from enlarging the set of trading
opportunities, or increasing the number of communication channels. However, the marginal
bene¯t of an additional link will often be decreasing with the number of links already formed.
20If players incur a cost for forming direct links, the e±cient network (typically the complete
network) may not be formed at equilibrium, because players do not internalize the positive
externalities they produce on other players. We claim that indirect transfers will allow for
the formation of the complete network in such trading and information sharing networks.
While indirect transfers enable the support of e±cient networks as equilibria of the game,
there is no guarantee that e±cient networks are the only equilibria of the game. We now show
that, in games with link separable payo®s and nonnegative externalities, e±cient networks
are the only equilibria of the game if we allow cooperation by all players in the formation
of additional links. More precisely, we strengthen the de¯nition of pairwise equilibrium to
allow all players to change their o®ers/demands on a given link.
A vector t is a strong pairwise equilibrium of the indirect transfer game if it is an equi-
librium of the game, and there does not exist any ij = 2 g(t) and S ½ N, and b t that di®ers
from t only on tk
ij where k 2 S, and such that ¼i(t¡ij;b tij) ¸ ¼i(t), for all players i 2 S, with
strict inequality for some of the players.
This de¯nition is weaker than a strong equilibrium, where arbitrary subsets of players
can alter all of their strategies. We work with the weaker de¯nition since the Corollary
below still holds for this weaker de¯nition. In fact, it turns out that under link separability
and nonnegative externalities, the strong equilibria and the strong pairwise equilibria of the
indirect transfer game coincide. This is easy to see as the payo®s separate completely across
links, and so one can consider links one at a time.
Corollary 3 If payo®s are link-separable and satisfy nonnegative externalities, then g is
supportable via a strong pairwise equilibrium of the indirect transfer game if and only if g is
e±cient.
6 Network Contingent Transfers
We now consider network formation games where players can condition their transfers on
the network that is formed.
As we see now, allowing transfers to be contingent on the network that forms has a big
impact on the set of networks that can be supported as equilibrium networks, even when only
direct transfers are possible. To understand why contingent transfers may help to support
e±cient networks, even when only direct transfers are possible, reconsider Example 3. In
that example, the e±cient network could not be formed in the direct transfer game, and we
argued that the e±cient network could be supported if indirect transfers were allowed, as
player 1 needs to subsidize the formation of link 23. There is another possibility, which does
not require the use of indirect transfers, but instead relies on contingent transfers. Player 1
could make transfers to player 2, to pass them on to player 3. The di±culty is that if player
1 makes this transfer to player 2, then player 2 might not form the link with player 3 and
keep the transfer. This can be recti¯ed if transfers can be made contingent on the network
that forms.
21More generally, contingent direct transfers can be built up along paths so that they end
up moving as if they were indirect transfers within connected components. This insight is
the key to the following proposition and corollary.
Proposition 6 Consider the contingent version of the direct transfer game and any u.
There exists an equilibrium where the network g is formed and the payo®s are y 2 I Rn where




i2N(g0) yi for all g0 2 C(g), and
yi 6= ui(g) implies i 2 N(g).
Corollary 4 Consider the contingent version of the direct transfer game. Consider any
u and network g such that
P
i2N(g0) ui(g) ¸ 0 for all components g0 2 C(g). There exists an
equilibrium supporting g. Moreover, there is an equilibrium corresponding to each allocation




i2N(g0) yi for each g0 2 C(g) and yi = ui(g) or yi < 0
implies i= 2 N(g).
Proposition 6 is based on a constructive proof, where we explicitly derive equilibrium
contingent transfers to support the network. While this proposition shows that a wide set of
networks can be supported as equilibria of the contingent direct transfer game, it is limited
by the fact that transfers cannot °ow across separate components of a network in the direct
transfer game, even if payments are contingent. If we allow for contingent indirect transfers,
then there are additional networks that can be supported, as we now show.
Proposition 7 Consider the contingent version of the indirect transfer network formation





i ui(g), and yi >u i(g) implies i 2 N(g).15 There exists an equilibrium where g is formed
and payo®s are y.
Corollary 5 Consider the contingent version of the indirect transfer network formation
game, and any u. Any e±cient network such that disconnected players earn zero payo®s is





i ui(g) and yi > 0 implies i 2 N(g).
15The y's in Proposition 7 are required to be nonnegative. One can also support the networks from
Proposition 6 that are not covered in this proposition through the construction used there. The di®erence
is that here one sometimes needs a player not in N(g) to subsidize the formation of a component that has a
negative value to its members. For this to work, it must be that the disconnected player earns a nonnegative
payo®, or they would withdraw their subsidies. Rather than break this into separate cases, we have simply
worked with the assumption of nonnegative payo®s.
22Proposition 7 and Corollary 7 show that the combination of indirect transfers and allowing
these to be contingent allows the support of almost all e±cient networks as equilibria. The
artifact that this includes situations where negative externalities might be present is due to
the fact that we are considering only equilibrium and not pairwise equilibrium.
Pairwise Equilibria with Contingent Transfers
Propositions 6 and 7 have counterparts for pairwise equilibrium,16 provided the network
being supported is e±cient and there are nonnegative externalities. A simple extension of
the proof Lemma 1 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 6 Consider the contingent version of the indirect transfer network formation
game, and any u satisfying nonnegative externalities. Consider the contingent version of the
indirect transfer network formation game. Consider any e±cient network g and allocation





i ui(g), and yi >u i(g) implies i 2 N(g). Then g is supportable
as a pairwise equilibrium with equilibrium payo®s y.
7 Transfers to Prevent Link Formation
The previous analysis shows that e±cient networks can be supported as a Nash equilibrium
of the indirect contingent transfer game under very mild assumptions on the payo® function.
However, in order to sustain e±cient networks as pairwise equilibria, we needed the additional
restriction that externalities are nonnegative. To see why this is important, consider the
following example exhibiting negative externalities.
Example 6 Negative Externalities and Ine±cient Pairwise Equilibria






If two (separate) links form, then the four players each get a payo® of 1.
16In order to de¯ne pairwise equilibrium, allow players i and j to vary their announcements ti
ij(¢) (as





All other networks result in a payo® of 0.
In this example, the only pairwise equilibria are ine±cient.17 Two players who are dis-
connected always bene¯t from forming a link, and there is no way to prevent them from
doing so. Indeed, two players involved in a link would like to pay the other players not to
form a link.
A Game with Payments to Prevent Link Formation
In order to overcome the di±culty exhibited in Example 6, we need to have a game where
players have the ability to make transfers to prevent the formation of links.
We ¯rst describe a game that allows payments to prevent link formation, but without
considering contingent transfers. We come back to incorporate contingencies after this game
is made clear. The game is based on the indirect link formation game, with the following
modi¯cation. Each player announces two transfers per link, instead of just one. This pair of




jk. Again, these must be
nonnegative if i= 2 jk, and can be anything otherwise. Player i also announces mi
j 2f +;¡g
for each j 6= i. The interpretation is that i is declaring whether the default decision on link
ij is not to add ij or to add ij.







































The contingent version of the game with payments to prevent the formation of links is
the version where the ti and mi
j's are announced as a function of g, and then solved via an
ordering over games, just as before.
17The e±cient network is supportable as an equilibrium, where the two disconnected players fail to form
a link because each demands too large a transfer. This, again, is a case where pairwise equilibrium is a
reasonable re¯nement.
24Equilibrium is again pure strategy Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and pairwise
equilibrium and strong pairwise equilibrium are the obvious extensions to this game. In
particular, here a pairwise equilibrium is an equilibrium such that no pair i and j could alter










and both be weakly better o® and one strictly better o®. A strong pairwise equilibrium is
an equilibrium such that there does not exist any ij and a deviation by some set of players




ij (¢), (and mi
j(¢)i fk 2 ij) such that all members of S are
strictly better o® as a result of the deviation.
To see how the game de¯ned above works, reconsider Example 6.
Example 7 Negative Externalities with Payments to Prevent Links
Consider the payo® function of Example 6. Let us ¯nd a pairwise equilibrium of the
game with payments not to form links that supports an e±cient network. Let us support the
e±cient network f12g. Have all players set t
i+









34 (f12g)=¡1=2, and m3
34(g)=m4
34(g)=¡ for all g, and mi
ij(g)=+
otherwise. For any other transfers set ti¢
ij(g)=¡2, and ti¢
jk(g) = 0 when i= 2 jk.
Here, players 1 and 2 pay players 3 and 4 if the link 34 is not formed. It is straightforward
to check that this is a pairwise equilibrium.
Proposition 8 In the contingent game with indirect transfers to form or not to form links,
any e±cient network is supportable via pairwise equilibrium, and in fact via strong pairwise
equilibrium.
Proposition 8 shows that with the ability to make contingent indirect transfers that both
subsidize the formation or the prevention of links, e±cient equilibria are supportable via
pairwise equilibria.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have de¯ned a series of games of network formation where transfers among players are
possible, and through an analysis of the equilibrium networkse have shed light on how the
type of transfers is related to the support of e±cient networks. We pointed out two basic
hurdles in supporting e±cient networks in equilibrium. First, the presence of positive exter-
nalities in payo®s may prevent the formation of e±cient networks, because players involved
in a link do not internalize the external e®ects the link has on other players. Second, players
may be unable to reach an e±cient network because the transfers needed to prevent the
deletion of various subsets of links may be incompatible. Overcoming positive externalities
relies on players' ability to subsidize the formation of links by other players, and overcoming
25negative externalities relies on their ability to pay to prevent the formation of links. The
problem of dealing with the combinatorial nature of the set of bilateral links that need to
be considered together is overcome if players have the ability to condition their transfers on
the entire network.
We would like to point out a limitation of our analysis. While some of our results provide
complete characterizations of supportable networks (for instance, the network balance con-
ditions, the link separability conditions, and the conditions outlined for the contingent direct
transfer game); others only outline su±cient conditions for the support of e±cient networks
and rely on constructive proofs. This leaves open some questions of the precise necessary
conditions for supportability in some of the games, which goes together with a question of
which ine±cient networks might emerge in some of the games. Closing the remaining gaps
to developing a full understanding of the situations where e±cient networks emerge as the
unique plausible equilibria of a network formation game is a priority for future research.
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A Pairwise Stability and Equilibrium Networks
In this Appendix, we discuss the relation between the networks supported in the direct
and indirect transfer games, and the pairwise stable networks introduced by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996). This discussion highlights the connections between situations where the
allocation rule is ¯xed before the formation of the networks, and situations where players
can freely bargain over the allocation of the value of additional links.
The following de¯nitions identify networks that are stable when the payo®s are ¯xed
before the formation process.18
A network g is pairwise stable with respect to a pro¯le of utility functions u if
(i) for all i and ij 2 g, ui(g) ¸ ui(g ¡ ij), and
(ii) for all ij = 2 g,i fui(g + ij) >u i(g) then uj(g + ij) <u j(g).
18The ¯rst two de¯nitions are from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Strong pairwise stability is discussed
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, section 5), but is not named.
27This is a self-evident solution concept that requires that no player bene¯t by severing a
link and no two players bene¯t by adding one.
A network g is pairwise stable¤ with respect to a pro¯le of utility functions u if
(i) for all i and ` ½ Li(g), ui(g) ¸ ui(g n `), and
(ii) for all ij = 2 g,i fui(g + ij) >u i(g) then uj(g + ij) <u j(g).
This variation on pairwise stability is stronger than pairwise stability in that it allows
players to sever sets of links rather than just considering one link at a time. This solution
is discussed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and is also essentially the same as the pairwise
Nash equilibrium re¯nement of pairwise stability discussed by Goyal and Joshi (2003).19
The next de¯nition is a way of incorporating transfers into the study of network formation
without actually modeling the bargaining process explicitly.20
A network g is pairwise stable with transfers with respect to a pro¯le of functions u if
(i) ij 2 g ) ui(g)+uj(g) ¸ ui(g ¡ ij)+uj(g ¡ ij), and
(ii) ij = 2 g ) ui(g)+uj(g) · ui(g ¡ ij)+uj(g ¡ ij).
Part (ii) captures the idea that there are no two players who could add a link between
them, together with some transfers, and both be better o®. Part (i) captures the idea that
if a link is in the network, then there must be some transfer (possibly 0) for which both
players do not wish to delete the link.
While the notions of pairwise stability and pairwise stability¤ can di®er from the equilibria
of the direct transfer game, the notion of pairwise stability with transfers captures some of
the spirit of the equilibria of the direct transfer game.
Proposition 9 The set of networks supportable as pairwise equilibria is exactly the inter-
section of those networks that are supportable via the direct transfer game and the networks
that are pairwise stable with transfers.
19For a more in depth discussion of the relation between the concepts of pairwise stable and pairwise
stable¤, see Calvo-Armengol (2004). We stay away from the term pairwise Nash equilibrium, to avoid
confusion with pairwise equilibrium.
20This di®ers from the concept of pairwise stability allowing for side payments that is discussed by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). That concept had a stronger requirement in (i), requiring that ui(g) ¸ ui(g ¡ ij) and
uj(g) ¸ uj(g¡ij). If transfers are possible in sustaining a network, and not just in deviations, then arguably
the de¯nition here is more appropriate.
28The relationship between supportable networks, pairwise equilibria, and the other pair-
wise stability concepts is outlined in the following proposition. The relationships between






(i) The set of pairwise equilibria is a subset of the set of equilibria.
(ii) If a network g is pairwise stable¤ relative to a pro¯le of utility functions u, then it is
supportable via the direct transfer game and it is pairwise stable.
(iii) There exist u and g for which g is pairwise stable¤ (and thus pairwise stable and sup-
portable), but not supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
(iv) There exist u and g for which g is supported via pairwise equilibrium (and thus sup-
portable) and pairwise stable but not pairwise stable¤.
(v) There are networks that are supportable and not pairwise stable nor supportable via
pairwise equilibrium.
(vi) There are networks that are pairwise stable and not supportable (nor supportable via
pairwise equilibrium, nor pairwise stable¤).
29(vii) There are networks that are both supportable and pairwise stable, but not pairwise
stable¤ nor supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
(viii) There are networks that are supportable via pairwise equilibrium and not pairwise sta-
ble.
(ix) There exist networks that are pairwise stable¤ (and thus pairwise stable) and at the
same time supported via pairwise equilibrium (and thus supportable).
Proof of Proposition 10: (i) follows from the de¯nition of pairwise equilibrium. The
pairwise stable part of (ii) is direct. To see the other part of (ii), set ti
ij = t
j
ij = 0 for each
ij 2 g, and ti
ij = ¡X for each ij = 2 g, for some X>0. For large enough X this forms an
equilibrium. To see (iii), consider the empty network in Example 9. To see (iv), see Example
10. To see (v), consider the empty network in Example 1. To see (vi), see Example 8. To
see (vii), see Example 11. To see (viii), see Example 9. To see (ix), see the complete network
in Example 1.
The examples illustrating the claims in Proposition 10 are as follows.
























































u2 = ¡4 u2 = ¡4
u1 =1
































































u2 = ¡4 u2 = ¡4
u1 =2
All other networks have value of 0. The network f12;23g is supportable via pairwise
equilibrium and pairwise stable but not pairwise stable¤.
Example 11 Supportable and Pairwise Stable but not Pairwise Stable¤ nor Supportable via
Pairwise Equilibrium
This is the same as Example 10, except that the complete network leads to u1 =6 ,
u2 = ¡3, and u3 = ¡1. The network f12;23g is still supportable and pairwise stable, but
no longer supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
31B Proofs
This Appendix contains the proof of the Propositions in the body of the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1: The network g is supported via an equilibrium of the direct
transfer network formation game relative to the pro¯le of utility functions u if and only if








ij ¸ 0 for all ij 2 g.
Furthermore, we know that in equilibrium, we cannot have ti
ij + t
j
ij > 0 for any ij,a s
then either one of the players would strictly bene¯t by lowering their ti
ij.21















ij ¸ 08ij 2 g

















` ¡ ºij = ¡1; for all ordered pairs i 2 N and ij 2 g, and
¹i
` ¸ 0 for all i 2 N and ` ½ Li(g), ºij ¸ 0 for all ij 2 g.
Since we are free to choose any the ºij's do not appear in the objective function, this














` ¡ ºij for all ordered pairs i 2 N and ij 2 g, and
¹i
` ¸ 0 for all i 2 N and ` ½ Li(g).
As the objective can be set to 0 by setting all of the ¹i




`mui(g;`) is at least 0 for all sets of ¹i
`'s that satisfy the constraints. The con-
straints correspond to the de¯nition of balanced weights, and thus the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given Propositions 10 and 1, the ¯rst statement follows directly.
Thus, the result follows from Lemma 1.
21We can set ti
ij = t
j
ij = ¡X for some large enough scalar X for any ij = 2 g, to complete the speci¯cation
of the equilibrium strategies.









ij are both nonnegative.
Working across the two inequalities generated by each one of these, we ¯nd the equality to -1.
32Proof of Lemma 1: Consider t supporting g in either game. In the indirect transfer game,
for any ij = 2 g and k= 2 ij, without loss of generality rearrange transfers so that tk
ij = 0. Since
g is e±cient, and satis¯es nonnegative externalities, it must be that ui(g+ij)+uj(g+ij) ·
ui(g)+uj(g), and so mui(g;ij)+muj(g;ij) · 0. Given that tk
ij = 0 for all k= 2 ij, it follows
that any joint deviation by i and j on ij that leads to an improvement for one player, must
lead to a loss for the other player.




As the game has nonpositive externalities, this implies that for all links muk(g;ij) · 0 for
all k 6= i;j. Hence, mui(g;ij)+muj(g;ij) ¸ 0: Now by convexity in own-links, mui(g;`) ¸ P





























































which is the required balance condition.
The Second statement obtains from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 4:(i) Given that f(2) <f(1)¡c, any two players who are not directly
connected will improve their utilities, and thus the total value, by forming a link.
(ii) and (iii). Consider g0, a component of g containing m players. Let k ¸ m ¡ 1b et h e
number of links in this component. The value of these direct links is k(2f(1) ¡ 2c). This
leaves at most m(m ¡ 1)=2 ¡ k indirect links. The value of each indirect link is at most
2f(2). Therefore, the overall value of the component is at most
k(2f(1) ¡ 2c)+( m(m ¡ 1) ¡ 2k)f(2): (1)
If this component is a star then its value would be
(m ¡ 1)(2f(1) ¡ 2c)+( m ¡ 1)(m ¡ 2)f(2): (2)
33Notice that
(1) ¡ ( 2 )=( k ¡ (m ¡ 1))(2f(1) ¡ 2c ¡ 2f(2));
, which is at most 0 since k ¸ m¡1 and c>f(1)¡f(2), and less than 0 if k>m¡1. The
value of this component can equal the value of the star only when k = m ¡ 1. Any network
with k = m ¡ 1, which is not a star, must have an indirect connection which has a path
longer than 2, getting value at most 2f(2). Therefore, the value of the indirect links will be
below (m ¡ 1)(m ¡ 2)f(2), which is what we get with star.
We have shown that if c>f(1) ¡ f(2), then any component of a e±cient network must
be a star. Note that any component of a e±cient network must have nonnegative value.
In that case, a direct calculation using (2) shows that a single star of m + m0 individuals
is greater in value than separate stars of m and m0 players. Thus if the e±cient graph is
nonempty, it must consist of a single star. Again, it follows from (2) that if a star of n
players has nonnegative value, then a star of n + 1 players has higher value. Finally, to
complete (ii) and (iii) notice that a star encompassing everyone has positive value only when
f(1) +
(n¡2)
2 f(2) >c .




ij = ¡X and tk
ij = 0 for k= 2 ij, where X is su±ciently large to be exceed the largest
marginal utility of any agent for any set of links. If ij 2 g, by e±ciency
P
k muk(g;ij) ¸ 0:
If muk(g;ij) ¸ 0 for all k set all the transfers tk
ij =0 .I fmui(g;ij) < 0 and/or muj(g;ij) < 0
then set the corresponding ti
ij and or t
j
ij equal to the marginal utility, and then for each k
such that muk(g;ij) > 0 set tk
ij 2 [0;mu k(g;ij)] so that
P
l ti
ij = 0. This is possible by the
e±ciency of g.
These t are such that for any ij 2 g, mul(g;ij) ¸ tl
ij whenever l 2 ij or l= 2 ij and tl
ij > 0.
Let us argue that this forms an equilibrium of the indirect transfer game.
First, note that by the de¯nition of X, if there exists an improving deviation, there will
exist one that only changes t's on links in g.
By convexity in all links, if there exists a deviation that is improving for some l on tl on
some set of links, then there exists some deviation that involves at most one link tl
ij, with
the possibility that l 2 ij.F o r ij 2 g, increasing transfers is costly and does not change
the outcome. Reducing transfers implies that the link will not be formed. Such a deviation
cannot be pro¯table as mul(g;ij)¡tl
ij ¸ 0i fl 2 ij or if l= 2 ij and tl
ij > 0. It is not possible
to lower tl
ij below 0 if l= 2 ij.
The last claim in the Proposition follows from Lemma 1.
Proof of Corollary 3 We ¯rst show that the e±cient network is supported in a strong




0. Consider then the following transfer scheme. For any link such that
P
k wk




ij ¸ 0, let tk
ij = 0 for all k. If at least one of the two involved players has a negative
marginal utility from that link, consider all players k for which wk






ij=jKj) and for i such that wi
ij < 0 set ti
ij = wi




ij < 0 set transfers tk
ij = X where X is very large. For any ij 2 g(t), it is clear











Next, suppose by contradiction that an ine±cient network is supported in a strong pair-
wise equilibrium. As g is ine±cient, there must exist either ij 2 g and
P
k wk
ij < 0o r
ij = 2 g and
P
k wk







ij < 0. Hence, one of the players must have a pro¯table deviation by changing
transfers so as to sever the link. If
P
k wk
ij > 0, construct a transfer scheme as above. ( If
wi
ij ¸ 0 and w
j
ij ¸ 0, let tk
ij = 0 for all k. If at least one of the two involved players has
a negative marginal utility from that link, consider all players k for which wk
ij > 0 and set





ij=jKj) and for i such that wi
ij < 0 set ti
ij = wi
ij:) Under
this transfer scheme the link is formed and all players increase their utilities.




i2N(g0) yi for all g0 2 C(g),
and yi 6= ui(g) implies i 2 N(g) follow from the balance of transfers across components and
the observation that in equilibrium the transfers will sum to 0 on any link that is formed.
To complete the proof, let us show that any such network g and allocation y can be
supported as an equilibrium.
Let Y = 3maxfmaxi jyij;maxi;g0 jui(g0)jg.
For g0 6= g, set ti
ij(g0)=¡Y for all i and j.
For g, set transfers as follows. For any ij = 2 g set ti
ij = t
j
ij = ¡Y .
For ij 2 g we set transfers as follows.
Consider a component g0 2 C(g).
Find a tree h ½ g0 such that N(h)=N(g0).23
Let player i be a root of the tree.24 Consider each j who has just one link in the tree.
There is a unique path from j to i. Let this path be the network h0 = fi1i2;:::;i K¡1iKg,
where j = i1 and i = iK.

















Do this for each path in the tree.




23A tree is a network that consists of a single component and has no cycles (paths such that every player
with a link in the path has two links in the path).
24A root of the tree is a player who lies on any path that connects any two players who each have just one
link in the tree.
25For k = 1 only the second equation applies, and for k = K only the ¯rst applies.
35Under these transfers, g will be the network that forms and y will be the payo® vector.
Let us check that there are no improving deviations.
Consider a deviation that leads to another network g0 6= ; being formed. This must
involve a net loss for any i as i's payo® must be below ui(g0)¡Y . Next, consider a deviation
that leads to the empty network. It must be that that the deviating player is i 2 N(g)i n
which case the new payo® is 0 for i, which cannot be improving as yi ¸ 0. So, consider a
deviation by a player i that still leads to g being formed. Player i's promises ti
ij(g) can only
have increased, which can only lower i's payo®.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Let Y = 3maxfmaxi jyij;maxi;g0 jui(g0)jg.
For g0 6= g, set ti
ij(g0)=¡Y for all i and j, and set ti
jk(g0)=0f o ri= 2 jk.
For g, set transfers as follows. Let A = fijyi >u i(g)g and B = fijyi <u i(g)g.
For i 2 A let `i(g) be the number of links that i has in g. Set ti
ij(g)=
¡yi+ui(g)
`i(g) if ij 2 g
and set ti
ij(g)=¡Y if ij = 2 g, and ti
jk = 0 otherwise.
For i 2 B let
¸i =
ui(g) ¡ yi P
j2B uj(g) ¡ yj
:


















if jk 2 g; j 2 A and k= 2 A;
= ¡Y if jk = 2 g and i 2 jk; and
= 0 otherwise:
For i= 2 A [ B, set ti
ij = ¡Y if ij = 2 g and ti
jk = 0, otherwise.
Under these transfers, g will be the network that forms and y will be the payo® vector.
Let us check that there are no improving deviations.
Consider a deviation that leads to another network g0 6= ; being formed. This must
involve a net loss for any i as i's payo® must be below ui(g0) ¡ Y . Next, we consider a
deviation by a player i that leads to the empty network. This cannot be improving as
yi ¸ 0. So, consider a deviation by a player i that still leads to g being formed. Player i's
promises ti
jk(g) can only have increased, which can only lower i's payo®.
Proof of Proposition 9: It is clear that the set of pairwise equilibria is a subset of the
set of equilibria of the direct transfer game. Let us show that any network supportable as a
pairwise equilibrium is also pairwise stable with transfers. Consider a pairwise equilibrium
b t. For any link ij 2 g, player i prefers to announce b ti
ij than any transfer X such that
36X + b t
j
ij < 0: Hence, ui(g)¡ b ti
ij ¸ ui(g ¡ ij): Similarly, uj(g)¡ b t
j
ij ¸ ui(g ¡ ij). Summing up
the two inequalities, ui(g)+uj(g)¡( b ti
ij + b t
j
ij) ¸ ui(g¡ij)+uj(g¡ij) and as ( b ti
ij + b t
j
ij) ¸ 0,
ui(g)+uj(g) ¸ ui(g ¡ ij)+uj(g ¡ ij): Conversely, suppose that ij = 2 g: If ui(g)+uj(g) >
ui(g ¡ ij)+uj(g ¡ ij), de¯ne a new transfer vector e t where e th
kl = c th
kl for all kl 6= ij and
e ti
ij = ui(g)¡ui(g¡ij)¡";e t
j
ij = uj(g)¡uj(g¡ij)¡" where " is chosen so that e ti
ij+e t
j
ij ¸ 0: It





















jk, contradicting the de¯nition
of pairwise equilibrium.
Finally, let us argue that any network g that is supportable and is also pairwise stable
with transfers is supportable as a pairwise equilibrium. Consider an equilibrium b t that
supports g. We argue that b t must also be a pairwise equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists some ij = 2 g such that





ik ¡ b t
i












jk ¡ b t
j






with one inequality holding strictly, and where b ti
ij + b t
j
ij ¸ 0 (as otherwise the link ij does
not form and the payo®s could not have changed). Thus,
ui(g + ij) ¡ b t
i




ij + b t
j
ij ¸ 0 it follows that
ui(g + ij)+uj(g + ij) >u i(g)+uj(g);
which contradicts the fact that g is pairwise stable with transfers.
Proof of Proposition 8: For n = 2, the Proposition is straightforward, as the only networks
are the empty and single link network. The single link network is supportable as a (strong
pairwise) equilibrium if and only if it has nonnegative value. In the case where a link's value
is nonpositive, the empty network is clearly supportable as a (strong pairwise) equilibrium.
So consider a setting where n ¸ 3. Let g be such that
P
i(g) ¸ 0.
Let Y = 3maxi;g0 jui(g0)j.




ij (g0)=¡Y for all i and j, and set ti
jk(g0) = 0 for i= 2 jk. Set
mi
j(g0)=+i fij = 2 g0 and mi
j(g0)=¡ if ij 2 g0. Note that under these rules, g(t(g0);m(g0))
(the links that would form given these announcements) is the complement of g0.
For g, set transfers as follows. Let u =
P
i ui(g)
n be the average payo® from g, which is at
least 0. Let A = fijui(g) ¸ ug and B = fijui(g) < ug, and nA and nB be the corresponding
cardinalities.
37Set mi
j(g0) = + for all ij 2 g and mi
j(g0)=¡ if ij = 2 g. Set the t's as follows. If nB =0 ,
then set tk¢
ij = 0 for all k and ij.
For nB > 0, let ¸j =
u¡uj(g) P
k2B u¡uk(g) for k 2 B and ¸j =0i fj 2 A.






n¡1 for all j, and set ti¢
jk(g) = 0 when i= 2 jk.F o r






n¡1 for all j, and set ti¢
jk(g)=( ¸j +¸k)
ui(g)¡u
n¡1 when i= 2 jk.
Under these announcements, g is formed and each player's payo® is u. Consider any
deviation by a player i. Given the announced t¡i and m¡i (and the fact that there are
three or more players), i can only induce the empty network and a payo® of 0. This can
not be improving. Consider a deviation by some group of players S on the announcements
pertaining to a link ij. Again, they can only induce the empty network and a payo® of 0,
or else the network g and some reallocation of their own payo®s. Neither of these deviations
can make each member of the group as well o® and some better o®.
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